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Abstract. We ask whether a shift to instrument independence aﬀects central bank behavior when
monetary policy is already operating under the constrained discretion of an inﬂation targeting goal.
Taking advantage of the unique UK experience to identify such an exogenous break, we estimate Taylor
rules via alternative methods, speciﬁcations and proxies. We detect empirically two novel results: the
Bank of England has responded to the output gap, not growth; and in a much stronger way once
more independent. Both ﬁndings are consistent with New Keynesian theory of monetary policy, the
Bank’s mandate, and the evolution of the UK business cycle. Moreover, the institutional move to
greater autonomy of the Bank of England, having also augmented its responsibility, accountability and
transparency in achieving the delegated inﬂation target, has in eﬀect increased the sensitivity of the
Bank to, and the freedom to counter, inﬂationary pressures arising — with anchored inﬂation — via the
output gap.
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1. The Recent UK Monetary Policy Framework as a ‘Controlled Experiment’
An issue of cardinal importance in economic policy research, debates and reforms that has not yet been
suﬃciently studied is how institutions inﬂuence policy and economic outcomes. This paper constitutes
an eﬀort to improve our understanding in this general direction, by focusing on a particular type of
institutional change that arises only rarely in economic contexts, in the sense of resembling a ‘controlled
experiment’. Our objective here is to address the question whether a shift to instrument independence
aﬀects central bank behavior when monetary policy is already operating in an inﬂation targeting regime,
implying goal dependence.
1 Such has been the recent experience with monetary policy making in the
United Kingdom (UK). We examine it empirically, in terms of policy reaction functions recovered from
the data.
2
UK monetary authorities moved to (ﬂexible) inﬂation(-forecast) targeting in October 1992, and in
May 1997 the Bank of England (BoE) was formally granted operational independence from Her Majesty’s
(HM) Treasury. In essence, the shift allowed the newly inaugurated Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
at the Bank to set interest rates (each month), earlier the task of the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the
Treasury. Before this institutional change the Bank of England was one of the least independent major
central banks in the world.
3 Being granted instrument independence, it did not receive goal independence,
though, to use the terminology introduced by Fischer (1994) and Debelle and Fischer (1994). The
responsibility for setting the primary goal of monetary policy, in terms of a numerical inﬂation target
(every year), was kept with HM Treasury. This nuance is important, insofar the BoE has no autonomy
as large as that of the European Central Bank (ECB) or the Federal Reserve System (Fed). The Bank of
England still has to act under the ‘constrained discretion’, in the words of Bernanke and Mishkin (1997)
—o r‘ ﬂexible rule’, according to Woodford (2003) — imposed by the inﬂation targeting framework. Yet
the Bank’s augmented degree of operational freedom was also accompanied by a corresponding increase
of its responsibility, accountability and transparency in achieving the delegated inﬂation target, as, for
instance, Lasaosa (2005) has emphasized.
4
Because of the explicit public announcement of the timing of these changes, to inﬂation targeting and
to operational independence, both could be interpreted as exogenous. We therefore see in that a rare
opportunity to explore econometrically the eﬀects of central bank instrument independence on policy
1Inﬂation targeting — or, more precisely, inﬂation-forecast targeting — is the monetary strategy that appears to have
become dominant in the modern theory and practice of central banking; see, for instance, Piger and Thornton, eds. (2004)
or Bernanke and Woodford, eds. (2005).
2An approach evaluating the outcomes of central bankers’ intentions (‘words’) and actions (‘deeds’) that prevails in current
applied work; see Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 1999, 2000) and the subsequent literature.
3This has been admitted, among others, notably by Eijﬃnger and Schaling (1995) in a pre-independence publication of the
Bank itself.
4See also Briault, Haldane and King (1997), for an earlier account on the relationship between Bank of England’s inde-
pendence and accountability, and Eijﬃnger and Hoeberichts (2002), for an international comparison along the lines of
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responses shaped out under the goal dependence of an established inﬂation targeting strategy. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to deal directly and through an applied perspective with
the interesting, policy-informing issue summarized in the title.
The corresponding theoretical perspective appears to have been better explored, notably in recent
research within the ‘legislative approach to monetary policy’, as labeled by Athey, Atkeson and Ke-
hoe (2005), broadly involving issues of optimal contracts, mechanism design or principal-agent inter-
actions. This literature extends, in fact, earlier work on optimal monetary policy in the tradition of
Kydland and Prescott (1977), who established the dominance of rules over discretion because of the
‘time-(in)consistency’ problem: it leads to ex-post incentives for a government to use ‘surprise inﬂation’
to reduce the real value of any outstanding ﬁat money, as Calvo (1978) pointed out, and to what Barro
and Gordon (1983 a) termed (average) ‘inﬂationary bias’ of a central bank acting upon discretion (and,
potentially, under the inﬂuence of interfering politicians, i.e., the ‘political business cycle’). With re-
peated interaction, Barro and Gordon (1983 b) proposed the build up of (good) reputation and, hence,
credibility as a solution to the inﬂation bias under discretion and, thus, as an alternative to a rule-based
policy. Canzoneri (1985) then showed discretion to be optimal when the central bank can exploit pri-
vate information. Other solutions to the inﬂationary bias were further on suggested in the literature,
the most prominent being Rogoﬀ’s (1985) central banker with ‘conservative’ preferences, Walsh’s (1995)
contract-theory approach, and the still broader institutional-design perspective on targeting rules as a
particular modern type of monetary regime. Such inﬂation targeting frameworks were initially adopted
in the early 1990s by pragmatic central bankers and government oﬃcials in New Zealand, Canada, Chile,
Israel, the UK, Sweden, Australia, Finland and Spain, to be somewhat later more formally justiﬁed in a
growing number of academic papers and books.
5
The theoretical arguments we sketched, supported by the ﬁndings of the parallel empirical literature,
6
summarize why a central bank should be legally and de facto made independent from interfering govern-
ments or parliaments with shorter-term horizons and vested interests. Simply put, a more autonomous
central bank tends to lead to a lower actual inﬂation, on average, thus avoiding the inﬂationary bias.
However, there are also theoretical and empirical claims against (too much) central bank independence:
(i) too much independence may leave the central bank unaccountable, and this is certainly not demo-
cratic; (ii) the credibility problem of central banks may either not really exist, being merely a theoretical
5Following the lead of Haldane, ed. (1995), Leiderman and Svensson, eds. (1995), Svensson (1997 a, b), Bernanke and
Mishkin (1997), Herrendorf (1998), Vickers (1998), and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999), to enumerate the
earliest work that concentrates explicitly on inﬂation targets.
6Beginning with Parkin and Bade (1978), Alesina (1988), Cukierman (1992) and Alesina and Summers (1993), to mention
the earliest studies, all claiming desirability of central bank independence. More recent, again largely favorable, overviews
are provided in Berger, de Haan and Eijﬃnger (2001) and Walsh (2005), among others.DOES INSTRUMENT INDEPENDENCE MATTER UNDER AN INFLATION TARGETING GOAL? 5
artefact, or — conversely — extend as well to consolidated government entities;
7 (iii) an autonomous mone-
tary authority may care too much about inﬂation and totally ignore output and employment ﬂuctuations,
and may therefore slip into a ‘deﬂationary bias’ which disrupts the ﬁnancial system and economic activ-
ity.
8 That is why restrictions have been suggested to the degree of central bank independence too, which
leads us to the question we pose as a title to the present empirical study.
Fischer (1994) and Debelle and Fischer (1994) have ﬁrst argued that instrument independence coupled
with goal dependence —s p e c i ﬁed by Svensson (1997 a) and Herrendorf (1998) as an inﬂation targeting
framework, whereby the government delegates the reference interest rate setting to the central bank (or
a monetary policy committee) but retains the quantiﬁcation of the numerical inﬂation goal for itself
— is the socially optimal institutional arrangement to formulate and implement monetary policy in a
democratic society. This type of monetary regime is what Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) eloquently called
constrained discretion, again in an inﬂation targeting context. Eijﬃnger and Hoeberichts (2002) have
further emphasized that such a democratic approach to the conduct of monetary policy would require
augmented responsibility of the central bank for its actions as well as accountability to the government
and/or parliament. Accountability implies a few dimensions, one of which — with a potential to solve
the private information problem identiﬁed by Canzoneri (1985) when central bank discretion is optimal
—i st h etransparency of actual policy making.
There are, thus, huge applied as well as analytical literatures on both central bank independence and
inﬂation targeting, but in isolation. One contribution of the present econometric study is to look at their
intersection. We mostly build on the Taylor rule methodology in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000)
and Nelson (2003) but also on other relevant studies on the UK. We detect empirically two novel results:
ﬁrst, throughout the inﬂation targeting period the Bank of England has systematically responded to
the output gap, and not at all to output growth; second, it has done so in a much stronger way once
being granted instrument independence. These ﬁndings are consistent with New Keynesian theory of
monetary policy, the Bank’s mandate, and the evolution of the UK business cycle. Yet we stress in
interpreting them that the institutional move to greater autonomy of the BoE has played a major role
too, reﬂected in the estimated quite higher post-independence response to the output gap: receiving
operational freedom has, in eﬀect, augmented the Bank’s responsibility, accountability and transparency
in achieving the delegated inﬂation target and has ultimately increased the sensitivity of the Bank to
inﬂationary pressures arising — with anchored inﬂation — via the output gap.
7McCallum (1997) notably argues that (i) it is inappropriate to presume that central banks will, in the absence of any
tangible precommitment technology, inevitably behave in a ‘discretionary’ fashion that implies an inﬂationary bias, and
sees no necessary tradeoﬀ between ‘ﬂexibility and commitment’; (ii) to the extent that the absence of any precommitment
technology is nevertheless a problem, it will apply to a consolidated central bank-plus-government entity as well, and thus
contracts between governments and central banks do not overcome the motivation for dynamic inconsistency. Forder (1998,
2000) surveys such issues in a rather similar skeptical light too.
8The classic example of the Great Depession and the recent one of Japan’s long deﬂation could be invoked here.DOES INSTRUMENT INDEPENDENCE MATTER UNDER AN INFLATION TARGETING GOAL? 6
The paper is further down structured as follows. The next section describes the data and some
preliminary tests. Section 3 presents our alternative estimation methods and speciﬁcations of Taylor
rules and discusses the econometric results we obtain, oﬀering a unifying interpretation of our principal
ﬁndings. The fourth section concludes.
2. Data and Preliminary Tests
2.1. Data. All data were downloaded from the statistical pages on the websites of the UK Oﬃce of
National Statistics (ONS) and the Bank of England (BoE). Our sample consists of quarterly observations,
starting with the fourth quarter of 1992, when inﬂation targeting was introduced in the UK, and ending
with the fourth quarter of 2004. The second quarter of 1997, when instrument independence was granted
to the BoE, splits the sample into a pre-independence and post-independence subsamples.
Following most other Taylor rule papers on the UK, in particular Nelson (2003) and Martin and Milas
(2004), we assume that the short-term interest rate supposed to be the operating instrument of the Bank
of England is best proxied by the 3-month Treasury bill rate.I n ﬂation is measured by two alternative
indexes that are usual choices when working with UK data: (i) the Retail Price Index (RPI), as in
Martin and Milas (2004) and Kesriyeli, Osborn and Sensier (2004), among others; and (ii) the same
Retail Price Index but eXcluding the mortgage rate (RPIX), as, for instance, in Nelson (2003).
9 Our
measure for the output gap is, alternatively, constructed out of two available time series: (i) the ﬁnal
or revised data for real GDP, as in the majority of studies on Taylor rules; and (ii) the real-time or
initially released data for the same variable, real GDP, available to policy makers ‘in real time’:
10 more
precisely, we use the real-time series constructed by Nelson and Nikolov (2001) and accessible on the
Bank of England’s website. Moreover, we have ﬁltered each of these real GDP series in level, real-time
and ﬁnal, by two now standard (although not perfect) procedures to obtain respective measures for the
output gap, namely: (a) by ﬁtting a quadratic trend, as in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000) and
Nelson (2003), among others; and (b) by a Hodrick-Prescott detrending (with a smoothing parameter
equal to 1600, as recommended for quarterly data), as in Martin and Milas (2004) and Kesriyeli, Osborn
and Sensier (2004), among others. These procedures have, of course, their advantages and shortcomings.
To arrive at results that are not necessarily sensitive to the detrending employed, we have preferred to
work with both ﬁlters.
Descriptive statistics for the two periods of interest in the present study, pre-independence inﬂation
targeting (1992:4-1997:1) in Figure 1 and post-independence inﬂation targeting (1997:3-2004:4) in Figure
2 are illustrated below.
9The RPIX has been the oﬃcially announced measure of UK inﬂation and guide for UK monetary policy in the period
1992-2003, and the RPI has performed that same role before 1992.
10Orphanides (2001, 2003) ﬁrst argued in favor of real-time data, on the grounds that they are more realistic and, hence,
that they usually ﬁtb e t t e rT a y l o rr u l er e g r e s s i o n s .DOES INSTRUMENT INDEPENDENCE MATTER UNDER AN INFLATION TARGETING GOAL? 7
[Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here]
2.2. Preliminary Tests. Nominal GDP data and the GDP deﬂator — hence, real GDP, by construction
— were available at their source as seasonally adjusted (sa), whereas both price levels, the RPI and the
RPIX, as well as the 3-month Treasury bill rate were not seasonally adjusted (nsa). We thus performed
seasonality tests and found both price levels and the interest rate to display seasonal patterns. Conse-
quently, two versions of our Taylor rule regressions were estimated: (i) with the raw data; and (ii) with
seasonally adjusted RPI, RPIX and 3-month Treasury bill rate.
In a similar study for the euro area based on the cointegration approach, Gerlach-Kristen (2003)
pointed out that stationarity tests for the variables entering Taylor rule regressions were not systemati-
cally reported in most of the previous literature. In agreement with her critique, we tested our variables
for stationarity, applying three alternative unit root tests. We generally found that the price levels, RPI
and RPIX, could be either I(1) or I(2); hence, inﬂation could be stationary or not, depending on the
chosen test. The 3-month Treasury bill rate and the real GDP gap obtained from quadratic-trend ﬁtting
cannot be treated deﬁnitely as stationary either. Only the real GDP gap obtained from Hodrick-Prescott
detrending appeared to be most likely I(0). With no overwhelming evidence against stationarity and
bearing in mind the notorious low power of unit root tests, in particular in short samples like ours, we
ultimately followed the New Keynesian theory of monetary policy and performed Taylor rule estimation
in the standard way, that is, relying on the procedure in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000). These
authors defend the key assumptions in their work — stationarity of inﬂation and the nominal interest rate,
as we shall also assume here — by stressing that they are both empirically and theoretically plausible.
3. Estimation Methods, Specifications Estimated and Key Findings
Our overall empirical strategy was to apply the most common techniques used by now in similar
Taylor rule studies. These techniques relate to ordinary least squares (OLS), in the earliest literature,
and to two-stage least squares (TSLS) and the generalized method of moments (GMM), in the more
recent papers. Another objective we pursued was to begin from simpler speciﬁcations and move to
more complicated Taylor rule versions and to econometrically better suited and justiﬁed techniques,
thus basically following the chronology in which the literature evolved. We therefore started with a
logical point of departure, by estimating the original Taylor rule with a few alternative proxies. Tests
for structural breaks were then performed on it, essentially to check the validity of our split of the UK
inﬂation targeting sample in the second quarter of 1997. Yet for theoretical and econometric reasons
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approach to estimating forward-looking Taylor rules popularized by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998,
2000).11
3.1. Ordinary Least Squares: Classic and Backward-Looking Taylor Rules.
3.1.1. Point of Departure: The Original and Classic Taylor Rules. We estimated the Taylor (1993) rule
on UK quarterly data for our two subsamples both in its original speciﬁcation and in what we would
call, following Woodford (2003), classic version. The original Taylor (1993) rule can be written as
(3.1) iT





t is the nominal interest rate (NIR) targeted by the monetary authority (i.e., the short-term
policy instrument), πt − πT is the so-called inﬂation gap (that is, the deviation of actual inﬂation, πt,
from a constant inﬂation target, πT), xt ≡ yt − yP
t is the output gap (with yt being actual output and
yP
t some measure of potential output). iT is the desired constant NIR target when both gap measures
are zero; more precisely, iT ≡ r∗ +πT,w h e r er∗ is interpreted in a Wicksellian manner12 as the constant
equilibrium ‘natural’ real interest rate. bj,l denotes the coeﬃcient to the respective variable of interest
(expressed by the relevant letter according to our notation) j = π,x,i (j =0stands for some compound
intercept terms made explicit in the formulas that follow) at a respective lag(−)/lead(+) (expressed by
an integer number) l = ...,−2,−1,0,+1,+2,... (l =0designates, of course, a current-period response).
We can estimate (3.1), as speciﬁed with contemporaneous response parameters, directly from the data
(for iT
t , πt and xt)i fw eknow the inﬂation target πT.W ed i ds ow i t hπT =2 .5,a si sm o s ta p p r o p r i a t e
for our particular country case and sample period (which will become evident a little bit later, when







+ bπ,0πt + bx,0xt
and estimated in the form of (3.2) as a classic Taylor rule.
Our results are presented in the ﬁrst pair of columns in Table 1.
11Another recent estimation technique was implemented by Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci (2002). They apply the
structural time series (STS) approach proposed by Harvey (1989) to generate series of the expected inﬂation rate and
output gap. By contrast, the Clarida-Galí-Gertler (1998, 2000) GMM approach essentially consists in using the errors-in-
variables method to model rational expectations: in it, instead of forecasting inﬂation and output — e.g., by Kalman ﬁlter
methods, as in Muscatelli-Tirelli-Trecroci (2002) — future actual values replace as regressors expected values, as we explain
later on.
12Woodford (2003), chapter 1, traces the intellectual history of policy reaction functions back to the works of Wicksell
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[Table 1 about here]
The original (or classic, if estimated transformed) Taylor rule performs quite impressively during our
post-independence subsample. All variables are (i) statistically signiﬁcant and have (ii) the expected
(from theory) sign and (iii) magnitudes that seem quite reasonable. Furthermore, the coeﬃcients bπ,0
and bx,0 are found practically the same, 0.85, as Taylor (1993) argued (however, he quantiﬁed them both
at 0.5 instead, without attempting econometric estimation). The only major problem with the regression
results in Table 1 is serial correlation (reﬂected in the value of the Durbin-Watson statistics). Lagrange
multiplier Breusch-Godrfrey tests have established a likely positive autocorrelation of the residuals of
the regression of order 1.W h e na nAR(1) correction in the error process is introduced in the equation,
with no any other modiﬁcation, our results do not change qualitatively (although in quantitative terms
policy responses become twice weaker), as can be seen in the second pair of columns in Table 1. In
the pre-independence subsample another problem is that the output gap is statistically indistinguishable
from zero, no matter which measure we use for it. However, when using more complicated Taylor
rule speciﬁcations and more sophisticated econometric techniques, as reported further down, we obtain
results of a similar spirit. One interpretation may be in the sense that the Bank of England has not
(systematically) considered the output gap in designing its monetary policy during 1992-1997 but has
(consistently) reacted to it, as well as to inﬂation, during 1997-2004. Moreover, the estimated coeﬃcients
on inﬂation do not unambiguously indicate that the response to it by the BoE has increased or decreased
in magnitude in the post-independence period relative to the pre-independence one. We return with
more analysis and a plausible interpretation to these initial ﬁndings in the later parts of the present
section.
3.1.2. Structural Break Tests. To check for structural breaks in our sample and, in essence, to see if our
sample split could be conﬁrmed econometrically, we performed Chow breakpoint and forecast tests on
the classic Taylor rule (3.2). The dates we selected for the tests were potentially the most likely ones to
have resulted in structural instability in UK monetary policy throughout the 1990s and until 2004. All
these changes have been implemented following oﬃcial public announcements, as discussed by Nelson
(2003), among others, and can thus be considered as exogenous:
(1) Membership of the British sterling in the Exchange-Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European
Community, as from October 1990;
(2) Sterling crisis and suspension of the ERM in the UK, in September 1992, followed by the instau-
ration of an inﬂation targeting framework for monetary policy as from October 1992;
(3) Target inﬂation reformulated in June 1995 from a target band (or range)o f1% to 4% (implying
a mid-point of 2.5% p.a.) to an explicit medium-term point target of 2.5% p.a.;DOES INSTRUMENT INDEPENDENCE MATTER UNDER AN INFLATION TARGETING GOAL? 10
(4) The Bank of England granted operational independence from HM Treasury in May 1997, and in
June 1997 the 2.5% point target announced to become symmetrical: i.e., to give equal weight to
circumstances in which inﬂation is higher or lower than the target rate;
(5) In December 2003, target inﬂation lowered from 2.5% p.a. to 2% p.a., and expressed as from
January 2004 in terms of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), instead of the
RPIX.
The breakpoint and forecast Chow tests we performed conﬁrmed that the structural breaks delimiting
our sample, (2) and (4) above, are the most supported by the data. We, therefore, continued to estimate
over our two subsamples and to compare the results across them.
3.1.3. Backward-Looking Taylor Rules. One way to address the problems of endogeneity and, potentially,
serial correlation usually encountered in classic Taylor rule equations while still applying the OLS method
is to estimate them with all regressors lagged and by also adding an additional lagged dependent variable.
Such backward-looking Taylor rules can be written in the form:
(3.3) iT











with the dynamic structure truncated at some relevant lag length N. Most papers have found that
lags of 1 or 2 are often suﬃcient to capture the dynamics of such equations. Another common ﬁnding,
in addition to the problems of a theoretical nature in ignoring forward-looking rational expectations,13
has been that backward-looking Taylor rules are weak in terms of econometric output. This is what our
results conﬁrmed indeed.
3.2. Two-Stage Least Squares: Classic and Backward-Looking Taylor Rules. A second way to
address the problems of endogeneity and, potentially, serial correlation in classic Taylor rule equations
is to replace OLS by TSLS. Such is the main estimation strategy in Nelson (2003). It is also what we
did next.
3.2.1. The Original and Classic Taylor Rules Again. Our TSLS results enhanced, as a matter of fact,
those from the OLS estimation outlined above.
[Table 2 about here]
13On the other hand, a view has emerged that backward-looking rules contribute to protecting the economy from embarking
on expectations-driven ﬂuctuations. Yet Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) oppose this view in noting that a
common characteristic of the existing studies that arrive at this conclusion is their focus on local analysis. Conducting global
analysis instead, they ﬁnd that backward-looking interest-rate feedback rules do not guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium.DOES INSTRUMENT INDEPENDENCE MATTER UNDER AN INFLATION TARGETING GOAL? 11
Table 2 indicates that there is no any important diﬀerence in our conclusions, even in a quantitative
aspect, regarding the policy responses of interest. First, such equations for the UK perform amazingly
well and can be sensibly interpreted in the post-independence period of inﬂation targeting. Second,
they suggest that the output gap has not mattered before operational independence but has mattered
afterwards — even more than inﬂation, if we judge by the magnitude of the respective coeﬃcient estimates
— in monetary policy decisions at the Bank of England.
3.2.2. Backward-Looking Taylor Rules Again. Our TSLS estimation conﬁrmed further what the OLS
method had found earlier concerning backward-looking Taylor rules. That is why we would conclude that
the poor performance of such equations is most likely due not to the particular econometric technique
implemented but rather to their problematic justiﬁability from the perspective of economic theory.
3.3. Generalized Method of Moments: Forward-Looking Taylor Rules.
3.3.1. Forward-Looking Speciﬁcations: Theoretical Rationale and Econometric Estimation. As a third
method to quantify Bank of England’s feedback, in addition to OLS and TSLS, we ﬁnally turn to the
popular Clarida-Galí-Gertler (1998, 1999, 2000) approach to estimating forward-looking Taylor rules. We
do so because this recent methodology is appealing — and superior to both OLS and TSLS — in at least
two respects, a theoretical one and an econometric one. By deriving from microfoundations monetary
policy reaction functions within the set-up of the currently dominant and rather consensual paradigm of
the New Keynesian macromodel, the approach provides a solid theoretical rationale for similar empirical
work. The latter model, ﬁrst derived by Yun (1996) and King and Woolman (1996), is also known
— in a broader context — as the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) model, after Goodfriend and King
(1997). Such sticky-price analytical frameworks have by now been well explored, e.g., in Walsh (2003),
later chapters, and Woodford (2003). For that reason, we would only sketch below the ‘core’ equations
and relate them to the forward-looking feedback rules we estimated next, thus brieﬂyc l a r i f y i n gt h e
second major appeal of the Clarida-Galí-Gertler (1998, 1999, 2000) methodology, namely its econometric
rationale. It follows from both the underlying economic model, NNS, and the corresponding estimation
method, GMM. GMM essentially implies that some moment condition, or conditional expectation, should
equal zero in equilibrium from theory (e.g., a consumption Euler equation or an orthogonality condition
like the one we exploit later).
After log-linearization around a zero inﬂation steady state, the equilibrium conditions of the baseline
NNS model are embodied in four equations. Following Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) in ignoring
certain constant terms, but using our notation here, these can be written as:
(3.4) πt = δE[πt+1 |I t]+λ(yt − ξt),DOES INSTRUMENT INDEPENDENCE MATTER UNDER AN INFLATION TARGETING GOAL? 12
(3.5) yt = E [yt+1 |I t] −
1
σ
(it − E [πt+1 |I t]) + ζt,
(3.6) iT
t = βπ,+1E [πt+1 |I t]+βx,0xt,






Equation (3.4) is a forward-looking Phillips curve, also known as a forward-looking aggregate supply
(AS) curve. It is the information set at time t. δ is the discount factor from the utility function, and λ
the output elasticity of inﬂation. yt ≡ lnYt is the current-period level of output, and ξt is the natural
rate of output, deﬁned as the level of output that would obtain under fully ﬂexible prices and assumed to
follow an AR(1) process. This AS curve can be derived by aggregation of optimal price-setting decisions
by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms under Calvo (1983) individual price adjustment.
(3.5) is a forward-looking IS curve, derived as a combination of a standard consumption Euler equation
and a market clearing condition. σ denotes the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) embedded in
the utility function. ζt is an exogenous demand shock, assumed an AR(1) process similarly to ξt.
Equation (3.6) is a forward-looking monetary policy rule of the usual Taylor type.
(3.7), ﬁnally, is an interest rate smoothing equation, where it is the actual NIR.
A more realistic, empirical counterpart of (3.6) is a commonly used linear instrument rule of the Taylor
type:
(3.8) iT
t = iT + βπ,+k
¡
E [πt+k |I t] − πT¢
+ βx,+qE [xt+q |I t].
Adding and subtracting E [πt+k |I t] − πT to the RHS of (3.8) and rearranging, implies an ex ante







+( βπ,+k − 1)
¡
E [πt+k |I t] − πT¢
+ βx,+qE [xt+q |I t].
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000) point to some insights embodied in (3.9); it clearly shows
that (i) attaining the target ‘on average’ and assuming that the real interest rate is determined by non-
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given long-term ‘equilibrium’ real interest rate r∗ plus the inﬂation target πT (as noted earlier); (ii)
interest rate rules characterized by βπ > 1 — an inequality known as the ‘Taylor principle’, after Taylor
(1999) — and βx > 0 will tend to be stabilizing, to the extent that lower real interest rates boost economic
activity (these properties have not, however, been without controversy in the literature14).
Incorporating further a more general speciﬁcation of interest rate smoothing behavior, both evident
in the practice of central banks and suggested by theory, and allowing for exogenous interest rate (i.e.,
here also monetary policy) shocks extends (3.7) to its usual empirical counterpart:






In (3.10), L denotes the lag operator, βi (L) ≡ βi,−1 + βi,−2L1 + ... + βi,−nLn−1 where βi,−1 ∈ [0,1)
measures the degree of smoothing of interest rate changes and νt i saz e r om e a ni n t e r e s tr a t es h o c k .
Now plugging the Taylor rule target (3.8) into the partial adjustment model (3.10), representing the
expected values as realized values minus forecast errors, and rearranging yields an equation for the actual





























βπ,+k (πt+k − E [πt+k |I t]) + βx,+q (xt+q − E [xt+q |I t])
ª
+ νt.
εt in (3.12) is a linear combination of forecast errors and the exogenous disturbance to the interest
rate, νt: it is, thus, orthogonal to any variable in the information set It.L e t t i n gzt denote a vector of
variables within the central bank’s information set at the time when the decision on the interest rate
is made, that is, zt ∈ It,w i t he l e m e n t so fzt (and, therefore, instruments in the econometric sense)
any lagged variables that help forecast inﬂation and output as well as any contemporaneous variables
that are uncorrelated with νt,o n ec a nw r i t eE [εt | zt]=0 . (3.11) then implies the set of orthogonality
conditions
14The Taylor principle has not always been found to hold empirically, see, e.g., Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) for the
UK or Mehra (2002) for the US. Theoretically, this principle is usually a necessary and suﬃcient condition to guarantee
determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium, in the sense of unique stationary solution assuming stationary disturbance
processes, as Woodford (2001) has discussed, among others. More recent research, e.g., Davig and Leeper (2005) or
Carlstrom, Fuerst and Ghironi (2006), has modiﬁed or generalized the Taylor principle in various ways, depending on the
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¢0. To the extent that the dimension of vector zt is higher than the number
of parameters to estimate, 4 in our case, (3.13) implies overidentifying restrictions that can be tested
in order to assess the validity of the speciﬁcation estimated and of the set of instruments used.16 We
present and discuss such test statistics further down.

















βx,+q | {z }
≡bx,+q
xt+q + βi,−1 | {z }
≡bi,−1
it−1 + εt,
from where we obtained direct GMM estimates of what may be called — following, e.g., Surico (2004)
— the ‘reduced-form’ parameters (the b’s above). Then the corresponding ‘structural-form’ parameters
(the β’s above) were recovered using the deﬁnitions in (3.14). Approximate standard errors for the policy
responses of interest here, the β’s, were ﬁnally calculated by an application of the delta method. We
estimated speciﬁcations where the lead for inﬂation varied from 1 to 8 quarters ahead, k =1 ,...,8,a n d
that for the output gap from 0 to 4, q =0 ,...,4.T h e l e a d s o f k =2 ,3 for inﬂation and of q =0 ,1
for the output gap were strongly supported by the data from the viewpoint of both econometrics and
economics.17 Due to space limitations, we would focus on the results from our preferred, or ‘benchmark’,
speciﬁcations reported in Table 3.
[Table 3 about here]
Panels A and B in the table compare the policy response coeﬃcients from an identical forward-looking
Taylor rule estimated via GMM over the pre-a n dpost-independence subsamples, respectively, using the
15Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000) note that, by construction, the ﬁrst component of {εt} follows an MA(a) process,
with a =m a x{k,q} − 1 and will thus be serially correlated unless k = q =1 . GMM estimation should then be carried out
with a weighting matrix that is robust to autocorrelation (and heteroskedasticity), which we do.
16See, e.g., Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998), pp. 1040-1041.
17In the former case, the econometric characteristics of the regressions such as statistical signiﬁcance of most relevant
parameters, higher adjusted R-squared, lower standard error of regression (SER) and higher probability value of the Hansen
J-test for the validity of overidentifying restrictions have mattered overall. In the latter case, the signs and magnitudes of
the statistically signiﬁcant monetary policy feedback coeﬃcients to inﬂation and to the output gap and the value of the
interest rate smoothing parameter that make most economic sense and allow reasonable interpretation have been the major
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RPI to calculate inﬂation and both ﬁnal and real-time GDP gap data.18 As can be veriﬁed in the last
row of each panel, the validity of our overidentifying restrictions and of the set of our instruments cannot
be rejected for all equations, and the goodness of ﬁt is also very high. Then, the parameters of interest
are statistically signiﬁcant at all conventional levels in all speciﬁcations. Moreover, the positive expected
signs of the response to both inﬂation and the output gap and the bounds between 0 and 1 of the
smoothing parameter are everywhere satisﬁed.
We next turn to the magnitudes of the reaction coeﬃcients in our ‘benchmark’ forward-looking Taylor
rules in Table 3. Discussing any other of the alternative speciﬁcations we experimented with will not
modify the quantitative essence of our key conclusions. A major result that we ﬁnd robust across
our numerous forward-looking regressions is a much stronger response of the Bank of England to the
output gap after it became more autonomous. Thus, Table 3 reports always (i) statistically signiﬁcant
and (ii) positive estimates for the coeﬃcient to the contemporaneous output gap, βx,0,w h i c h ,m o s t
importantly, (iii) indicate a unanimous and considerable rise in its magnitude in the post-independence
period. An exact quantiﬁcation of this magnitude is, unfortunately, not possible, as numbers vary across
speciﬁcations. Nevertheless, we would conclude that the increase in BoE’s reaction to the output gap
under operational independence is anyway quite high, for two empirically inferred reasons. First, no
matter whether our ﬁnal or real-time data GMM estimates from forward-looking Taylor rules are taken
into account, the increase of the output gap coeﬃcient is substantial indeed (see, e.g., Table 3); as a
matter of fact, it is likely to be of the order of 2 to 3 times, if we also consider the most frequently observed
signiﬁcant values across our forward-looking speciﬁcations with alternative proxies (not reported here,
to save space). Second, another indication for a large increase in the response of the Bank to the output
gap after it began setting interest rates itself was captured by the classic Taylor rules we estimated via
OLS and TSLS earlier, as noted, with this response only becoming statistically signiﬁcant in the post-
independence subsample. Our econometric results, supportive of quite a big change in BoE’s reaction to
the output gap, lead us to believe that the institutional shift to greater central bank autonomy has also
played a role. We return with more interpretation to these points below.
By contrast, we cannot say much as to whether the response to inﬂation or the degree of interest rate
smoothing, reﬂected in our alternative estimates for the coeﬃcients βπ,+2 and βi,−1, have become stronger
or weaker after the Bank of England was granted operational independence. Evidently, any conclusion
in this sense would rest on a restrictive interpretation of a subset of our Taylor rule speciﬁcations and
proxies, which we would not wish to force on the data.19 For instance, ﬁnal data indicate an increase in
t h er e s p o n s et oi n ﬂation as well as in the degree of interest rate smoothing, irrespective of the particular
18We present our results with RPI inﬂation instead of RPIX inﬂation mostly because of the much higher variation of the
former relative to the latter in both estimated subsamples, as can clearly be seen in ﬁgures 1 and 2, which suggests a likely
higher precision of the slope estimates of BoE’s reaction function when the RPI is used to measure inﬂation.
19Likewise, our results are inconclusive on the empirical validity of the Taylor principle by subsample.DOES INSTRUMENT INDEPENDENCE MATTER UNDER AN INFLATION TARGETING GOAL? 16
output detrending used; whereas real-time data reverse this conclusion (see again Table 3). It might also
well be that, with respect to both inﬂation and interest rate smoothing, the post-independence behavior
of the Bank has not changed much, for one reason or another, to be deﬁnitely detected by our data.
This leads us to the question: Why should a central bank in an inﬂation targeting regime increase its
reaction to the output gap after receiving instrument independence, with its reaction to inﬂation at the
same time most likely not much changed (or, if increased, not at a comparable degree)?
Mihailov (2006) argued that this is exactly what the Bank of England — whose priority is to keep inﬂa-
tion low, the more so under ﬂexible inﬂation targeting — should have done once the evolving UK business
cycle is taken into consideration. The easiest way to understand this is to look at the dominant phase
of the business cycle before and after operational independence. Comparing the respective descriptive
statistics in ﬁgures 1 and 2, one can see that the output gap was characterized by a considerably negative
mean (and by much more volatility) according to all our four gap measures during the pre-independence
subsample and by a slightly positive mean (plus lower variability) during the post-independence one. It
is, then, clear that the Bank of England has reacted in a much stronger way to the output gap when
aggregate demand has, on average, been closer to potential supply, thus creating inﬂationary pressures,
i.e., (mostly) during the post-independence period when inﬂation was, moreover, credibly anchored at
the Bank’s target.
However, the magnitude of the increase in BoE’s response to the output gap appears econometrically
quite too large, as we already claimed, to be due only to the evolving UK business cycle. One contri-
bution of the present paper is, therefore, to complement and make more realistic the above explanation
by adding a second, institutional factor in the picture: namely, the move in May 1997 to central bank
instrument independence, but with goal dependence, in the UK monetary policy framework. The Bank’s
augmented autonomy has, in fact, implied a corresponding increase of its responsibility, accountability
and transparency in achieving the delegated inﬂation target. Lasaosa (2005), among others, illustrates
compactly our main point here by stressing that: (i) the Minutes of the MPC monthly meetings (intro-
duced with operational independence in mid-1997 and containing the individual votes of the nine MPC
members, four of which external) are published two weeks after each meeting; (ii) the average number
of pages of the Bank of England’s quarterly Inﬂation Report ( i n t r o d u c e dw i t hi n ﬂation targeting in late
1992) has increased since 1997 from around 45 to 65, including a new section entitled ”Monetary Policy
since Latest MPC”; and (iii) the Governor has to write an open letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer
on behalf of the MPC if inﬂation deviates more than one percentage point from the inﬂation target. All
these three institutional arrangements (and some other of a lesser importance, of course) accompanying
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transparency of UK monetary policy, hence the Bank’s responsibility when deciding on short-term inter-
est rates every month, conditional on the available economic data and forecasts. BoE’s much stronger
reaction to the output gap post-independence is, therefore, not surprising. It is a logical consequence: (i)
in part of the evolving UK business cycle, as claimed in Mihailov (2006); (ii) in part of the institutional
shift in the UK framework for monetary policy making, as we emphasize in the present paper; and (iii)
in part of the anchored inﬂation that characterizes the UK inﬂation targeting data (ﬁgures 1 and 2)
and, hence, anchored inﬂationary expectations. Without instrument independence for the central bank,
it is very likely that the government, wishing to support economic activity, would have exerted inﬂuence
through power to alleviate or prevent such a strong monetary policy feedback to the output gap, itself
intended as a forward-looking, preemptive response to rising inﬂationary pressures. Given our short
sample, containing roughly one full cycle of contraction and recovery of the British economy within the
inﬂation targeting period on which we focus here, we are not in a position to separate out the individual
contribution of each of the above three principal factors largely explaining the estimated change in Bank
of England’s reaction function. Future research could, of course, address this issue.
Real GDP Growth Instead of Real GDP Gap? We next subject our key result and its interpretation
oﬀered thus far to what may be called a theory-consistency empirical test for monetary policy under
inﬂation targeting. Mostly because of the well-known problems in measuring in ‘real time’ the true
output gap, which cannot be observed, the use of the rate of real GDP growth (or some combination
of it and other variables) instead of the real GDP gap has sometimes been proposed as desirable, for
pragmatic reasons, when estimating central bank policy reaction functions.20 But while responding to
an output gap measure is theoretically required in a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting regime like the one in the
UK, reacting to real output growth is not expected: neither from the viewpoint of conventional theory,
nor because of BoE’s delegated inﬂation target. So, has the Bank also reacted to real GDP growth,i na
way similar to its asymmetric response to the output gap across the business cycle? To check whether
BoE’s behavior has been theory- and goal-consistent — not erratic — under instrument independence, we
proceeded to estimation of the same Taylor rule speciﬁcations but with real GDP growth replacing real
GDP gap.
[Table 4 about here]
Table 4, featuring our benchmark speciﬁcations but now with real GDP growth (in % p.a.) as explana-
tory variable, presents evidence that what the Bank of England has really cared about throughout the
entire inﬂation targeting period is the output gap, and not the rate of growth of real output: nowhere
in this table, before as well as after operational independence, is the coeﬃcient on real GDP growth
20See, in particular, Orphanides et al. (2000), McCallum (2001), Orphanides (2003), and Carare and Tchaidze (2005).DOES INSTRUMENT INDEPENDENCE MATTER UNDER AN INFLATION TARGETING GOAL? 18
statistically signiﬁcant at all. According to our forward-looking Taylor rule GMM regressions, the UK
inﬂation targeting data thus clearly reject the idea that real GDP growth has guided BoE’s monetary
policy instead of the output gap.
There is good economic rationale, conventional as well as New Keynesian, behind such a ﬁnding.
It can be summarized in the following way. There is no need for a central bank to (aggressively)
react to any change in the rate of growth of real GDP per se; for example, real expenditure may grow
in a depressed economy and there is no reason to overhastily abort such a (stabilizing) tendency. It
is only with respect to a benchmark potential output (although controversial to estimate) that the
increase in aggregate demand should matter for inﬂationary expectations, and hence for an inﬂation-
targeting central bank. But once aggregate expenditure comes close to the estimated capacity of an
economy to produce output and threatens to surpass it, thus creating inﬂationary pressure and aﬀecting
unfavorably the (rational) expectations of economic agents about future inﬂation, the central bank should
respond (aggressively), the more so under a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting framework. Such interpretation
constitutes another important aspect in logically explaining the empirical ﬁndings in the present paper.
It conﬁrms that the Bank of England has reacted in a justiﬁed and consistent way to the changing
business cycle conditions in the period of its operational independence relative to the pre-independence
inﬂation targeting period, as also envisaged by its broader mandate and in agreement with its increased
responsibility and accountability.
3.3.3. Additional Robustness Checks and Avenues for Further Research. We ﬁnally point out to a few
dimensions of interest for further research into the topic, which constitute potential limitations of the
present study.
Exchange-Rate Augmented Taylor Rules. Part of the literature on Taylor rules estimates speciﬁcations
that explicitly include one or more (contemporaneous and lagged) exchange rate terms. This has been
considered appropriate especially for small open economies. However, Taylor (2001) argues that there is
no need to do so. The reason is that even if the exchange rate may matter a lot for a small open economy,
its dynamics will be reﬂected (almost immediately) in the dynamics of the price level, that is, in inﬂation
as well. So, once an inﬂation term is included in the Taylor rule, the exchange rate is always implicit
in the equation, via its pass-through onto import and consumer prices. Leitemo and Söderström (2005)
also claim that an explicit exchange rate term adds little to the performance of simple monetary policy
rules under exchange rate uncertainty. Yet as another robustness check of our ﬁndings we, nevertheless,
performed Taylor rule regressions with the nominal eﬀective exchange rate (NEER) index added to the
standard variables in (3.14). A general conclusion from this exercise was that the NEER came out as
statistically signiﬁcant but of a very negligible magnitude, practically close to zero, and with an uncertain
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all policy responses unrealistically low, the more so during the operational independence period, while
at the same time pushing the interest rate smoothing parameter and, especially, the adjusted R2 for the
regressions conspicuously high, which is indicative of a likely misspeciﬁcation. For this reason, we do not
report estimates and avoid here any further discussion of forward-looking Taylor rules with an explicit
exchange rate term.
Nonstationary Taylor-Type Policy Rules. As pointed out by Gerlach-Kristen (2003) and mentioned ear-
lier, the empirical literature on policy reaction functions has usually ignored the issue of stationarity of
the variables taken into account. She explores the econometric properties of the traditional Taylor rule
model using euro area quarterly data for 1998-2002 and ﬁnds signs of instability and misspeciﬁcation.
She then estimates interest rate rules using the cointegration approach and claims that such rules are
stable in sample and forecast better out of sample. The ﬁndings of Gerlach-Kristen (2003) are, certainly,
of interest. Moreover, nonstationarity may be relevant for part — if not all — of the UK time series we
included in our Taylor rule estimation, as was duly discussed. In this sense, a cointegrated approach
may deserve attention in future research.
Nonlinear Taylor-Type Policy Rules. The literature has also turned to explore potential nonlinearities
in feedback rules. For example, Martin and Milas (2004) and Kesriyeli, Osborn and Sensier (2004) have
directly addressed such issues with UK data, and Surico (2004) with US data. We would agree that this
is another, perhaps promising, avenue for further work.
Hybrid Monetary Policy Rules. So-called hybrid rules, which include both inﬂation and the price level
as policy response variables in addition to the output gap, have also been investigated.21 Jääskelä
(2005) has recently argued that it does not make sense to include the price level in a policy rule when
inﬂation expectations are backward-looking. But when they are forward-looking, the price level rule
and the hybrid rule are superior to the standard (inﬂation-based) Taylor rule under certainty about the
structural parameters of the model. However, he also admits that the standard (optimized)T a y l o rr u l e
is more robust to model uncertainty than both those alternatives. This feature of a higher robustness to
model uncertainty was another reason to focus our initial analysis here on the simplest case of commonly
employed Taylor rules, rather than hybrid, nonlinear or nonstationary ones. Potentially extending it in
ways to incorporate the more complex aspects brieﬂy discussed in the last few paragraphs remains thus
for further research.
21The debate on price level and inﬂation targeting, triggered by Fischer (1994), gave rise to a substantial literature in the
last decade. Nessén and Vestin (2005), for instance, show that the performance of a hybrid target can be superior to a
price level target and to an inﬂation target, taken separately, if commitments of an inﬂation targeting central bank are
not feasible. Batini and Yates (2003), on the other hand, study the pros and cons of (non-optimized)h y b r i dr u l e si na n
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4. Concluding Comments
This paper posed and investigated empirically a novel question: does a shift to central bank instrument
independence matter for the conduct of monetary policy that already operates under the ‘constrained
discretion’ of an established inﬂation targeting regime, implying goal dependence? We took advantage
of the unique experience in that sense of the United Kingdom, where the Bank of England was granted
operational independence from HM Treasury only in May 1997, while ﬂexible inﬂation-forecast targeting
had been eﬀective since October 1992. Our econometric strategy concentrated on estimating forward-
looking Taylor rules using the GMM approach, theoretically consistent with the New Keynesian monetary
policy model popularized in similar contexts by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 1999, 2000). Yet we also
applied OLS and TSLS to classic and backward-looking Taylor rules, for the purpose of comparability
with earlier work as well as across alternative econometric techniques.
Answering in summary to our title, we would conclude that the move to instrument independence
of the Bank of England has augmented the responsibility, transparency, accountability and the marge
de manoeuvre of monetary policy in achieving the delegated inﬂation target. This institutional shift
has, consequently, increased the Bank’s sensitivity to inﬂationary pressures, as captured by the much
higher policy reaction coeﬃcients to the output gap we estimated during post-independence. Without
instrument independence for the central bank, the government — wishing to support economic activity
—c o u l dh a v ee x e r t e di n ﬂuence to alleviate such a strong, anticipating feedback to the output gap. We
also presented evidence that the BoE has systematically responded to the output gap,a n dnot at all
to output growth, which is consistent with both conventional theory and the ﬂexible inﬂation targeting
mandate of the Bank: the monetary authority should care (for theoretical reasons), and did seem to care
(in our empirical results), not whether aggregate demand grows per se, but whether such growth implies
— as would be in a stage of the business cycle above or near potential supply — increasing inﬂationary
pressure.
Overall, the monetary strategy adopted in the UK in October 1992 and enhanced by the granting
of operational independence to the Bank of England in May 1997 seems to have been successful in
simultaneously avoiding three major policy problems known from the literature (and reﬂected in real-
world experiences): the inﬂation bias of full discretion with or without political pressure (e.g., many high-
inﬂation developing countries in a ﬂoating exchange rate regime), the lack of democratic accountability
under complete central bank independence (e.g., some critiques on the ECB), and the time inconsistency
of rigid rules (e.g., the currency board failure in Argentina). Our paper therefore brings partial evidence
in favor of the hypothesis ﬁrst proposed by Fischer (1994) and Debelle and Fischer (1994) that monetary
policy under instrument independence with goal dependence would generally tend to produce low average
inﬂation; as well as in favor of the now wide-spread claims of theoretical and empirical studies — in theDOES INSTRUMENT INDEPENDENCE MATTER UNDER AN INFLATION TARGETING GOAL? 21
spirit of the early work of Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), Svensson (1997 a) and Herrendorf (1998) — that
inﬂation targeting may well be close to optimal monetary policy and best central bank practice (given
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Panel A: Pre-Independence Subsample: 1992:4 — 1997:1 (18 observations)
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
iT 5.77∗∗∗ (0.15) 5.76∗∗∗ (0.09) 6.03∗∗∗ (0.23) 5.78∗∗∗ (0.13)
b0,0 3.88∗∗∗ (0.49) 3.68∗ (0.41) 5.00∗∗∗ (0.68) 4.58∗∗∗ (0.66)
bπ,0 0.75∗∗∗ (0.16) 0.83∗∗∗ (0.15) 0.41∗ (0.21) 0.48∗ (0.42)
bx,0 −0.03 (0.10) −0.12 (0.10) 0.27 (0.23) 0.20 (0.33)
AR1 term 0.44∗∗∗ (0.15) 0.42∗∗∗ (0.21)
Adj R2 0.63 0.66 0.75 0.72
SER 0.35 0.34 0.29 0.31
DW 0.90 1.07 AR1 correction AR1 correction
Fp - v 0.000224 0.000118 0.000046 0.000101
Panel B: Post-Independence Subsample: 1997:3 — 2004:4 (30 observations)
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
iT 4.95∗∗∗ (0.14) 5.01∗∗∗ (0.17) 4.56∗∗∗ (0.75) 4.18∗∗∗ (1.22)
b0,0 2.81∗∗∗ (0.45) 3.38∗∗∗ (0.56) 3.55∗∗∗ (0.81) 3.22∗∗ (1.27)
bπ,0 0.86∗∗∗ (0.17) 0.65∗∗∗ (0.21) 0.40∗∗∗ (0.14) 0.38∗∗∗ (0.14)
bx,0 0.85∗∗∗ (0.16) 0.38∗∗ (0.43) 0.37 (0.24) 0.37 (0.23)
AR1 term 0.90∗∗∗ (0.08) 0.93∗∗∗ (0.06)
Adj R2 0.61 0.39 0.92 0.91
SER 0.75 0.94 0.35 0.35
DW 0.39 0.22 AR1 correction AR1 correction
Fp - v 0.000001 0.000520 0.000000 0.000000
Table 1. Classic Taylor Rules: OLS Estimates on RPI and Final Real GDP Gap
Explanatory Note to Table 1: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; the method of
estimation is OLS; the estimated equations are (3.1) and (3.2), with intercepts iT and b0,0, respectively, and all
other parameters the same, as explained in the main text; standard errors for the directly estimated coeﬃcients
(iT and the b’s) are in parentheses; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ = statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively; AR1
= correction for an autoregressive process in the error of the regression of order 1;A d jR 2 =a d j u s t e dR 2;S E R=
standard error of regression; DW = Durbin-Watson statistic (for testing ﬁrst-order serial correlation in the error
process when there is no AR1 correction for it or lagged dependent variable in the regression speciﬁcation); F
p-v = F-statistic probability value (for the joint signiﬁcance of all estimated parameters).DOES INSTRUMENT INDEPENDENCE MATTER UNDER AN INFLATION TARGETING GOAL? 23
Panel A: Pre-Independence Subsample: 1992:4 — 1997:1 (18 observations)
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
iT 5.74∗∗∗ (0.16) 5.75∗∗∗ (0.09) 6.20∗∗∗ (0.38) 5.78∗∗∗ (0.13)
b0,0 3.76∗∗∗ (0.53) 3.51∗∗∗ (0.44) 5.62∗∗∗ (1.13) 4.42∗∗ (1.58)
bπ,0 0.79∗∗∗ (0.17) 0.89∗∗∗ (0.16) 0.23 (0.32) 0.54 (0.61)
bx,0 −0.05 (0.11) −0.16 (0.11) 0.48 (0.45) 0.13 (0.75)
AR1 term 0.52∗∗ (0.19) 0.39 (0.48)
Adj R2 0.63 0.66 0.73 0.72
SER 0.35 0.34 0.30 0.31
DW 0.94 1.16 AR1 correction AR1 correction
Fp - v 0.000228 0.000106 0.000067 0.000108
Panel B: Post-Independence Subsample: 1997:1 — 2004:4 (30 observations)
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
iT 4.94∗∗∗ (0.14) 5.00∗∗∗ (0.18) 4.66∗∗∗ (0.62) 4.23∗∗∗ (1.15)
b0,0 2.77∗∗∗ (0.45) 3.43∗∗∗ (0.57) 3.63∗∗∗ (0.70) 3.40∗∗∗ (1.22)
bπ,0 0.87∗∗∗ (0.17) 0.63∗∗∗ (0.22) 0.41∗∗∗ (0.15) 0.33∗∗ (0.15)
bx,0 0.89∗∗∗ (0.17) 1.24∗∗∗ (0.42) 0.56 (0.33) 0.65∗ (0.32)
AR1 term 0.88∗∗∗ (0.10) 0.92∗∗∗ (0.07)
Adj R2 0.61 0.38 0.91 0.91
SER 0.75 0.96 0.36 0.36
DW 0.40 0.24 AR1 correction AR1 correction
Fp - v 0.000001 0.000402 0.000000 0.000000
Table 2. Classic Taylor Rules: TSLS Estimates on RPI and Final Real GDP Gap
Explanatory Note to Table 2: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; the method of
estimation is TSLS; the estimated equations are (3.1) and (3.2), with intercepts iT and b0,0, respectively, and
all other parameters the same, as explained in the main text; standard errors for the estimated coeﬃcients are
in parentheses; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ = statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively; AR1 = correction for
an autoregressive process in the error of the regression of order 1;A d jR 2 = adjusted R2; SER = standard error
of regression; DW = Durbin-Watson statistic (for testing ﬁrst-order serial correlation in the error process when
there is no AR1 correction for it or lagged dependent variable in the regression speciﬁcation); F p-v = F-statistic
probability value (for the joint signiﬁcance of all estimated parameters).DOES INSTRUMENT INDEPENDENCE MATTER UNDER AN INFLATION TARGETING GOAL? 24
Panel A: Pre-Independence Subsample: 1992:4 — 1997:1 (18 observations)
Real GDP Data: Final /Revised/ Real-Time /Initial/
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
b0,+2 1.53∗∗∗ (0.13) 2.02∗∗∗ (0.21) 1.13∗∗∗ (0.16) 1.29∗∗∗ (0.18)
β0,+2 3.52 (0.31) 4.48 (0.47) 2.73 (0.40) 3.13 (0.43)
bπ,+2 0.38∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.21∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.45∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.37∗∗∗ (0.05)
βπ,+2 0.88 (0.08) 0.47 (0.09) 1.09 (0.09) 0.91 (0.11)
bx,0 0.11∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.21∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.07∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.02)
βx,0 0.60 (0.08) 0.48 (0.07) 0.47 (0.05) 0.29 (0.06)
bi,−1 0.56∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.55∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.59∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.59∗∗∗ (0.01)
Adj R2 0.75 0.76 0.83 0.71
SER 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.31
J-stat 0.302956 0.288247 0.282935 0.289121
OvId p-v 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.82
Panel B: Post-Independence Subsample:
1997:3 — 2004:4 (28 observations) 1997:3 — 2001:4 (18 observations)
Real GDP Data: Final /Revised/ Real-Time /Initial/
Real GDP Filter: Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott Quadratic Hodrick-Prescott
b0,+2 0.11 (0.11) −0.07 (0.15) 2.82∗∗∗ (0.22) 2.14∗∗∗ (0.20)
β0,+2 0.43 (0.44) −0.38 (0.76) 4.62 (0.37) 3.72 (0.34)
bπ,+2 0.46∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.38∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.30∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.42∗∗∗ (0.04)
βπ,+2 1.79 (0.08) 1.96 (0.14) 0.48 (0.05) 0.73 (0.06)
bx,0 0.21∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.17∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.92∗∗∗ (0.10) 1.06∗∗∗ (0.13)
βx,0 0.71 (0.16) 0.88 (0.25) 1.38 (0.16) 1.85 (0.23)
bi,−1 0.74∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.81∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.39∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.42∗∗∗ (0.03)
Adj R2 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.92
SER 0.35 0.35 0.24 0.29
J-stat 0.217969 0.224985 0.159138 0.264661
OvId p-v 0.73 0.71 0.97 0.85
Table 3. Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: GMM Estimates on RPI and Real GDP Gap
Explanatory Note to Table 3: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; inﬂation is com-
puted using the RPI; the method of estimation is GMM; the instrument set includes 4 lags of all (3) variables in
the estimated equation, (3.14), with k =2and q =0 ; standard errors for the directly estimated (reduced-form)
coeﬃcients (the b’s) in parentheses are calculated using a Newey-West weighting matrix robust to error auto-
correlation and heteroskedasticity of unknown form; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ = statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, 10% level,
respectively; standard errors for the indirectly estimated (structural-form) coeﬃcients (the β’s) are computed
via the delta method; Adj R2 =a d j u s t e dR 2; SER = standard error of regression; J stat = J-statistic: equals
the minimized value of the objective function in GMM estimation and is used, following Hansen (1982), to test
the validity of overidentifying restrictions when there are more instruments than parameters to estimate, like in
our case here (we have 3 × 4+1=1 3instruments, including the constant, to estimate 4 parameters, and so
there are 13−4=9overidentifying restrictions: under the null that the overidentifying restrictions are satisﬁed,
the J-statistic times the number of regression observations is distributed asymptotically χ2 (m) with degrees of
freedom m equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions, 9 in our case); OvId p-v = probability value of
the above-summarized Hansen test for m =9overidentifying restrictions.DOES INSTRUMENT INDEPENDENCE MATTER UNDER AN INFLATION TARGETING GOAL? 25
Panel A: Pre-Independence Subsample: 1992:4 — 1997:1 (18 observations)
Real GDP Data: Final /Revised/ Real-Time /Initial/
b0,+2 0.81∗∗∗ (0.14) 1.13∗∗∗ (0.29)
β0,+2 1.95 (0.33) 2.53 (0.65)
bπ,+2 0.57∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.49∗∗∗ (0.05)
βπ,+2 1.36 (0.09) 1.11 (0.12)
by,0 −0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
βy,0 −0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04)
bi,−1 0.58∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.56∗∗∗ (0.03)
Adj R2 0.68 0.67
SER 0.33 0.33
J-stat 0.283959 0.290898
OvId p-v 0.82 0.81
Panel B: Post-Independence Subsample: 1997:1 — 2004:4 (28 observations)
Real GDP Data: Final /Revised/ Real-Time /Initial/
b0,+2 −0.08 (0.08) 1.61∗∗∗ (0.25)
β0,+2 −0.64 (0.61) 2.88 (0.45)
bπ,+2 0.30∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.56∗∗∗ (0.04)
βπ,+2 2.27 (0.29) 1.00 (0.08)
by,0 0.01 (0.04) 0.12 (0.07)
βy,0 0.08 (0.37) 0.21 (0.13)
bi,−1 0.87∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.44∗∗∗ (0.05)
Adj R2 0.93 0.88
SER 0.33 0.36
J-stat 0.199089 0.262429
OvId p-v 0.78 0.86
Table 4. Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: GMM Estimates on RPI and Real GDP Growth
Explanatory Note to Table 4: All data are quarterly and for the United Kingdom; inﬂation is com-
puted using the RPI; the method of estimation is GMM; the instrument set includes 4 lags of all (3) variables in
the estimated equation, (3.14), with k =2and q =0 ; standard errors for the directly estimated (reduced-form)
coeﬃcients (the b’s) in parentheses are calculated using a Newey-West weighting matrix robust to error auto-
correlation and heteroskedasticity of unknown form; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ = statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, 10% level,
respectively; standard errors for the indirectly estimated (structural-form) coeﬃcients (the β’s) are computed
via the delta method; Adj R2 =a d j u s t e dR 2; SER = standard error of regression; J stat = J-statistic: equals
the minimized value of the objective function in GMM estimation and is used, following Hansen (1982), to test
the validity of overidentifying restrictions when there are more instruments than parameters to estimate, like in
our case here (we have 3 × 4+1=1 3instruments, including the constant, to estimate 4 parameters, and so
there are 13−4=9overidentifying restrictions: under the null that the overidentifying restrictions are satisﬁed,
the J-statistic times the number of regression observations is distributed asymptotically χ2 (m) with degrees of
freedom m equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions, 9 in our case); OvId p-v = probability value of










final data real GDP growth
real-time data real GDP growth
3-month Treasury bill rate
HP final data real GDP gap
quadratic final data real GDP gap
HP real-time data real GDP gap





















































Figure 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Data: Pre-Indepencence Boxplot (1992:4-1997:1,
18 observations)
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Figure 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Data: Post-Indepencence Boxplot (1997:3-
2004:4, 30 observations or 1997:3-2001:4, 18 observations for the real-time data output
gap measures)
Data Source: Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS), website.DOES INSTRUMENT INDEPENDENCE MATTER UNDER AN INFLATION TARGETING GOAL? 27
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